Abstract
Introduction
India"s role in post-9/11 Afghanistan has been a subject of intense pedantic policy deliberations, at times bordering on speculations. On one hand, India is seen to play a critical role in the reconstruction of the war-ravaged country, and on the other, India"s growing influence in Afghanistan as a result of its aid diplomacy is said to have increased Pakistan"s real or imagined concerns of encirclement in what it perceives to be its "strategic backyard". This "zero-sum" geopolitical rivalry between India and Pakistan, dubbed by Western analysts as the "new great game", is seen as a source of further instability.
India"s interests in post-9/11 Afghanistan have centred on three broad objectives -security concerns, economic interests and regional aspirations. In understanding India"s strategic thinking on Afghanistan, it would be useful to locate India"s strategic mind within the broad parameters of three schools of thought/paradigms: (1) Realist, (2) Neo-liberal, and (3) Nehruvian-Marxist. 2 The Realist perspective envisions India"s aid and development assistance as a useful tool directed at supporting the nascent democratic regime, the strengthening of which denies the space for return of the Taliban to the seat of power. The Neo-liberals prod India to take a more proactive role as a major regional and economic power with ambitions of extending its influence beyond its immediate neighbourhood for tapping enormous energy and trade potential in the region. India has worked towards this objective by reviving the role of Afghanistan as a land bridge, which connects South Asia with energyrich Central Asia for economic and energy interests. By linking stability with greater economic integration, India has been actively promoting greater trade and economic integration of Afghanistan with South Asia through the regional mechanism of South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC). The thinkers in the Nehruvian tradition, while arguing against interference in internal affairs, emphasise the need for regional cooperation and restoring "peace and neutrality" in Afghanistan, preferably under the aegis of the United Nations (UN).
To achieve these objectives, as indicated by various strands of Indian thinking, India adopted the "soft power", reviving its historical, traditional, socio-cultural and civilisational linkages with the war-ravaged country. This ideational and enabling role which has been well received by the Afghans, has important lessons for the international community for the long-term stabilisation of Afghanistan. However, as the discourse on the "end game" gains momentum, whether India"s interests and role can be sustained or even expanded to protect its core national security concerns emanating from the region, has emerged as a subject of immediate academic and policy importance.
India, Afghanistan and the Cold War
Most of the commentators on India"s foreign policy bemoan the absence of a "grand strategy" 3 as a factor which has impeded India"s rise as a major power on the global stage.
Contrary to such perceptions, a brief survey of India"s relations with Afghanistan would indicate that there has been a constant search for "the right balance between force and diplomacy, functional and political criteria." 4 Peace and stability in Afghanistan have remained important foreign policy objectives for India. Being members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), both countries maintained "neutrality" in the Cold War atmospherics. Afghanistan maintained neutrality by adhering to its traditional policy of bi-tarafi in its efforts to balance the great power rivalry. 5 The signing of a "Friendship Treaty" in 1950
paved the way for development of India"s friendly relations with King Zahir Shah"s regime which continued till the late 1970s.
The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, which brought the Cold War to India"s doorsteps, spurred immense diplomatic activity in New Delhi. According to a well-known commentator, "Never before in the history of Indian diplomacy was there so much groping for ideas and directions. Never before was India"s foreign policy an act of sterner choice." 6 There were serious concerns of great power confrontation and militarisation in the region with increased arms supplies to Pakistan by the US. J.N. Dixit, former Indian Ambassador to Afghanistan noted Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi"s, "reservations about the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 was tempered by the valid perception that this intervention had taken place only because Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, backed by the US, were trying to subvert a critical exercise being undertaken by a segment of Afghan society to transform their country from its semi-medieval predicament into a modern society." Historical anecdotes, however, suggest that despite India"s muted public opposition to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, India did register its displeasure at various private forums. 8 According to former Foreign Secretary, M.K. Rasgotra, "There was no international support for the Soviet intervention. In fact, Moscow"s intentions and motives were suspect even in friendly countries … Indira Gandhi telling Brezhnev in Moscow in October 1982 that he should withdraw Russian troops from Afghanistan; the sooner the better." 9 During the Soviet intervention, ensuring peace and stability in Afghanistan remained important foreign policy objectives for India. Criticising the external powers, for jeopardising peace and development in the region, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, at a joint session of Congress in June 1985, said, "Outside interference and intervention have put in jeopardy the stability, security and progress of the region. We stand for a political settlement in Afghanistan that ensures sovereignty, integrity, independence and non-aligned status, and enables the refugees to return their homes in safety and honour." 10 He asserted, "India could not remain indifferent to the developments which had brought the confrontation of major powers to its doorstep."
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Despite the deterioration of political situation in the region, relations between India and Afghanistan, especially on trade, banking, industry, sports, education and cultural exchanges continued uninterrupted. The signing of an agreement on 20 February 1984 in Kabul between the two countries envisaged several "measures for expanding and diversifying bilateral trade and for establishing direct contacts between the banks of the two countries." 12 A cultural exchange programme planned for 1985-87 between the two countries was signed in New Delhi on 7 August 1985. India agreed to provide ten scholarships to Afghan nationals for doctoral studies and other fellowships for visiting scholars for training in public cooperation and child development. India also agreed to impart training to Afghan nationals in repair and preservation of historical monuments and rare manuscripts. Further, both the countries agreed to undertake joint research and teaching programmes. India promised to strengthen the programme of Afghan studies, hold film weeks and supply textbooks. 13 India further agreed to assist Afghanistan in the expansion of its health institutions and provide equipment worth 8 G.S. Bhargava, South Asian Security after Afghanistan (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1983). 9 Brezhnev had said Taraki had been asking him for ten thousand Russian troops, that for a time he had repeatedly rejected the request but finally sent ten thousand troops and now there were one hundred thousand of them there. He added, "I do not know what they are doing there, I want to get out of Afghanistan, you know the area better, show me a way." Indira Gandhi had responded, "Mr Secretary General, the way out is the same as the way in." Maharajakrishna Rasgotra, "Afghanistan: The way out; Give guarantees for its neutrality", 
India's Strategic Interests and Challenges
India"s interests in Afghanistan need to be viewed in the security paradigm, in the context of India"s concerns of terror emanating from the extremely volatile Pakistan-Afghanistan border spilling into India. A strong, stable and democratic Afghanistan would reduce the dangers of extremist violence and terrorism destabilising the region. The Realist line of thinking is driven by "fear" of security considerations. This could be real or perceived fear of Pakistani military and intelligence agencies regaining their "strategic depth" by reinstalling a pliant Taliban regime in Afghanistan much to the detriment of India"s security imperatives. Thus, this stream of thinking emphasises on the need for India to use military and diplomatic tools to secure its "outer periphery" or "extended neighbourhood".
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Since 9/11, New Delhi"s policy has broadly been in congruence with the US objectives of decimating the Taliban-Al Qaeda combine and instituting a democratic regime in Kabul. However, nine years later, the Taliban has been able to regroup and resurge, in addition to further intensification of its linkages with Pakistan based anti-India groups. A worrisome development has been expansion of the Lashkar-e-Taiba"s (LeT) activities beyond Kunar and Nooristan provinces to other parts of Afghanistan, which could emerge as a base of antiIndian and anti-Western operations.
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While there is no denying the fact that India"s strategic interests lie in the long-term stabilisation of Afghanistan, India has invested substantially in power generation, infrastructure development, capacity building and small development projects. One of the While it provides economic opportunities for India in those countries, it also provides Afghanistan with an alternative in reducing its dependence on Pakistan for transit facility. This is of particular significance given the difficult trade and transit arrangements and bilateral relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. 32 Additionally, it provides the international community an alternative supply route through the north as the present routes through Pakistan are increasingly targeted by the insurgents.
To meet India"s burgeoning energy needs, the Neo-liberals emphasise on the need to connect Afghanistan as a potential route for access to rich energy resources in Central Asia. With this objective, India has been seen to be pursuing better relations with Central Asian states. It has provided a US$17 million grant for the modernisation of a hydropower plant in Tajikistan, and has signed a memorandum of understanding with Turkmenistan for a natural gas pipeline that will pass through Afghanistan and Pakistan.
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While India"s involvement in Afghanistan has accrued huge costs, it has generated tremendous goodwill among the locals. 34 Unlike other international donors, who have relied on their own agencies and subcontracting, thereby creating parallel structures of governance while doing little to extend the writ of the Afghan Government, most of India"s aid is currently channelled through the Afghan Government and works in conjunction with local needs. Whereas most of the Western aid resources have thus returned to the donor countries, through the phenomenon of "phantom" aid, India"s wide-ranging assistance programme provided directly to the Afghan Government is designed to maximise Afghan participation both at the government and community levels while maintaining low visibility. Moreover, India has actively provided assistance to women"s groups either through self employment generation schemes, health and capacity building not only in Kabul but also in the western province of Herat. Being long-term stakeholders in the rebuilding the social and economic fabric of the war-ravaged society, this mode of aid delivery through women"s groups and tribal organisations has proved to be effective in sustaining and even expanding such programmes.
In the difficult and insurgency prone areas of the south and east, India is investing in small development projects (SDPs) in tandem with the local needs, thereby ensuring greater local participation and ownership. This method of aid delivery finds roots in the Gandhian way of doing things at a local and community level. India"s assistance has broad cultural acceptance given the way aid is delivered within the socio-cultural milieu having shared history, culture and tradition. The Nehruvian school maintains the need to stay out of internal politics of Afghanistan while helping Afghanistan stand on its own feet. Unlike western countries, India avoids taking a judgemental or normative stance on issues of corruption, nepotism, cronyism or ineffectiveness of the Afghan Government, while continuing to aid the Afghan Government in terms of capacity and institution building. Of late, India has been active in reviving the historical and cultural ties with Afghanistan. As a part of cultural diplomacy, Indian musicians have been training young Afghans in musical instruments like the tabla and the sitar. Such joint musical performances have been occurring both in Kabul and places like Jalalabad, cementing the cultural ties and historical traditions of the region. Geopolitical rivalry continues to shape Pakistan"s response to the increasing bonhomie between India and Afghanistan. While Afghanistan looks towards India for greater cooperation, Pakistan appears determined not to allow such a scenario and is continually in search of ways and means to regain its "strategic depth" in Afghanistan. It typically sees any Indian presence and influence in Afghanistan, even those acquired through legitimate means, as inimical to its interests. It views the activities of India"s developmental assistance and goodwill it has generated among the local Afghans with a suspicion bordering on paranoia. The Realist school of thought perceives the Indo-Pakistan competition in Afghanistan to be a "zero-sum" game. Pakistan"s quest for "strategic depth" in the 1970s and its role in the Taliban"s advance to seat of power in Kabul (in the 1990s) have been continued with its present policy towards regaining its lost "strategic depth" by providing sanctuary to the Afghan Taliban leadership in its territory. Its attempts to use its "strategic assets" by brokering talks between the Afghan Government and sections of the Taliban which could place a pro-Pakistan dispensation in the seat of power Kabul in a scenario of the withdrawal of the western coalition forces from that country, has confounded such fears.
The recurring and lethal attacks by the Taliban and its affiliates on Indian personnel and the resultant insecurity scenario poses a major challenge for investing in large developmental http://catalogo.casd.difesa.it/GEIDEFile/INDIA%C3%90AFGHANISTAN_RELATIONS_POST-9-11.HTM?Archive=191494691967&File=INDIA%ADAFGHANISTAN+RELATIONS+POST-9-11_HTM. Accessed on 8 November 2010. 37 The gruesome and high profile symbolic attacks on the Indian Embassy in Afghanistan, in July 2008 and October 2009, continue to highlight the challenges and vulnerabilities of India"s involvement in Afghanistan. 42 Intended as a warning to India to downsize its role, these attacks are in a way aimed at raising the costs of such a policy of winning the hearts and minds of the local Afghans. After a brief hiatus, India is now set to resume its muchacclaimed medical mission work in Afghanistan which was scaled down following the February 2010 terror attack in Kabul that left nine Indians dead. 
Challenges to India's 'Aid Policy' in Afghanistan
India"s "aid policy" has generated intense domestic debate, given the vulnerabilities its projects and personnel face in Afghanistan. While some advocate the need to put "boots on ground", others propound continuation of the present aid policy vis-à-vis those who call for downsizing in case of US withdrawal. While the latter option would not be in India"s longterm strategic interests, an outright military response of troop deployment, apart from its limited utility, would work straight into propaganda of the Taliban and lead to evaporation of the goodwill among the locals. Having steered clear of the military option and provided huge assistance, India is seen as a friendly and neutral country with no ethnic affinities, unlike neighbouring countries who have actively exploited the ethnic affiliations through shared borders to wage proxy wars and subversion.
As the talks of "end game" intensify, there have been calls from various quarters for India to play a more active role as a "first tier global economic power, India needs to accept the responsibilities and risks that come with that stature." 45 Afghanistan is in some ways the test case of the extent to which India is willing to use its hard power to advance its strategic and commercial interests. Rahul Roy-Choudhury of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London says, "As India"s influence grows it will become increasingly involved in the local politics of a foreign country. It cannot afford to see itself as an innocent bystander anymore." 46 Similarly, former Indian diplomat Rajiv Sikri, criticising India"s soft power approach, notes in his writing, "Although India"s security remains deeply affected by what happens in Afghanistan, India"s disadvantage is that it is not involved in Afghanistan"s security in any meaningful way." 47 On the other end of the spectrum, are those who warn India getting into a "reputation trap" and being overstretched in a region which is perceived as Pakistan"s backyard. Western analysts who have internalised Pakistan"s concerns do call for downsizing of India"s presence to assuage Pakistan"s fear and concerns. 48 In Indian diplomatic circles, India"s role is increasingly being seen as of "negative interests" given that Pakistan will continue its proxy war against India from Afghanistan. There have been calls for redefining India"s interests in Afghanistan and formulating strategies of engaging Pakistan and using leverages to elicit responsible behaviour given that India"s security concerns stem from Pakistan.
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In Search of a Political Solution: Reintegration vs Reconciliation
As instability and violence in Afghanistan intensifies and talks of exit among various western nations gather momentum, the Afghan Government and international community have initiated parallel efforts of reconciliation and reintegration processes. While there is a lack of clarity on the international community"s attempts at finding a political solution to the Afghan War, New Delhi has indicated support for the Afghan-led reintegration process. As the debate on reconciliation gathers momentum, India will have to respond to various gestures made by the Afghan Government, international community and insurgent factions. In contrast to those favouring talks with the Taliban, following the February 2010 attack on Indians in Kabul, thinkers in the Nehruvian tradition like the Indian Vice President Hamid Ansari, Pakistan-Afghanistan envoy Satinder Lambah and Chinmay Gharekhan have urged India to adopt a neutral position in Afghanistan. M.K. Rasgotra favours steering clear of this loose soil of reintegration. "Wisdom demands that this task of reintegration be left to President Hamid Karzai," he advises. 54 The Nehruvian school of thought advocates keeping out of internal Afghanistan politics but carrying on the development works in the war-torn republic.
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India, Af-Pak Strategy and Conditional Withdrawal/Drawdown of Forces
The Af-Pak strategy of the US heightened hopes and expectations among the Afghans of a renewed American commitment and resources to bring change in the war-ravaged country. The Obama administration"s Af-Pak strategy, with its stated goal of 3D"s-disrupt, dismantle and destroy of terrorist infrastructure, was seen as a win-win situation in the Indian strategic community. The Indian government has stressed that India and the US share the same goal in Afghanistan, that is, stability of the country.
While it is difficult to fault such admirable ambition, a more mature foreign policy position would require looking at the details of the "stability" that continues to elude Afghanistan after a decade of a US-dominated policy. There is universal acknowledgement now that security in Afghanistan is at its worst since 2001 even as the western countries are moving towards a disengagement of troops. As a result, "beyond a general commitment against terrorism, the US notion of "stability" would look very different from that envisaged by India." Afghanistan without first dismantling the Pakistani military's sanctuaries and sustenance infrastructure for the Taliban. The proposed surge could help the already-entrenched Taliban sharpen its claws while strengthening US logistics dependence on the Pakistani military, which fathered that Islamist militia and LeT." 58 In a rather ominous note, Chellaney warns that "Unless the US reverses course on Pakistan, it will begin losing the war in Afghanistan." 59 He underlines the futility of the US effort in Afghanistan "without a fundamental shift in US policy on Pakistan and recognition in Washington that the path to success in Afghanistan lies through Pakistan." 60 Bharat Karnad, critiquing India"s piggy backing on the US Af-Pak policy states, "Free-riding offers relatively poor and weak countries or states, unwilling adequately to invest in their own defence, security without sweat, but it is something a would-be great power, such as India, should eschew." 61 Pakistan seeks reaffirmation of its crucial role in the war on terror, the Obama administration is grappling with how to balance India's role in Afghanistan. Washington is feeling pressure from Pakistan to limit India"s role in Afghanistan. 62 There is recognition of India"s positive contribution to the "build and transfer component" of the present US counter-insurgency strategy of clear, hold, build and transfer. As of late, there have been calls for expanding India"s developmental role in Afghanistan. 63 In the first Indo-US Strategic Dialogue in June 2010, Afghanistan topped the agenda. The need to work together in building an inclusive architecture and rebuilding Afghanistan was reiterated by American Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Indian External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna. 64 During the visit of President Obama in November 2010, there was reaffirmation of the positive role played by India in Afghanistan. President Obama appreciated India's enormous contribution to Afghanistan's development and welcomed enhanced Indian assistance that will help Afghanistan achieve self-sufficiency. The two sides committed to intensify consultation, cooperation and coordination to promote a stable, democratic, prosperous and independent Afghanistan. In the joint statement, the two sides resolved to pursue joint development projects with the Afghan Government in capacity building, agriculture and women's empowerment.
However, this was with a caveat. While talking about India"s positive role in Afghanistan, the dependence on Pakistan on the Afghan issue still exists. For instance, the US President underlined that all the countries of the region, including Pakistan, have to share the responsibility of bringing about stability in that nation. "Pakistan has to be a partner in this process [of bringing about stability in Afghanistan]… We don"t think that we can do this alone", he said, asserting "a stable Afghanistan is achievable." 65 The US dependence on Pakistan has remained a roadblock for deepening of India-US cooperation on Afghanistan.
The 'End Game' in Afghanistan
As the talks of exit gather momentum among the western nations, the search for an end game has intensified. In his 1 December 2009 speech at the US Naval Academy at West Point, President Barack Obama, in addition to renewing his commitment for the Afghan war by increasing the troop numbers, set a deadline of July 2011 for the conditional drawdown of forces. This arbitrary timetable, however, evoked regional scepticism and concern among the Afghans. In the event of withdrawal or drawdown of forces, in the face of declining support for the war among the domestic constituencies of western nations and the security situation further deteriorating in Afghanistan, there are serious concerns of conflict spillover into India.
In the Indian policymaking circles, debates on post-US exit strategies are gaining momentum. Concerns abound that the US$1.3 billion aid assistance, which has been the source of tremendous goodwill, may not be enough to sustain the reconstruction and development activities, in the case of premature international withdrawal. Moreover, New Delhi"s bigger worries are that Pakistan"s military might play a major role in the reconciliation moves in the post-US negotiated settlement. 66 Without a clear, integrated and Afghan-led reconciliation policy and adherence to the "red lines," the dangers of subversion of the presently weak Afghan Government by radical elements runs high and could undermine India"s interest of maintaining a democratic regime.
The Realists caution against the return of the Taliban or civil war-like conditions of the early 1990s as clearly not in India"s interest. According to former National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra:
"India will be one of the biggest losers if Taliban-isation grips Afghanistan and extremism spreads through Pakistan. Therefore, it is imperative that India ramps up its defence preparedness, which has been hopelessly neglected since the end of the Cold War. India should also expect more terror attacks from Pakistan-based groups if the Taliban finds a high enough space in Kabul. In the Afghanistan game, India stands to be the big loser and Pakistan the big gainer. India will need to think ahead to reverse that situation." 67 Similarly, K. Subrahmanyam indicates, "The war in Afghanistan is crucial from the point of view of Indian national security. If the Americans withdraw and jihadis emerge with a sense of triumphalism, India will face increasing onslaughts of terrorism. The LeT Chief has already declared his goal is to break up India. A US withdrawal will make them feel that they have defeated two superpowers and therefore they can take on India." 68 Indian diplomacy
wants to avoid such a scenario by seeking a long-term international commitment in Afghanistan and strengthening the hands of the Afghan Government that would stonewall against any future return of the Taliban to the seats of power in Kabul.
The talk of US downsizing its troop presence its operations, however, has found resonance among certain sections of the Indian diplomatic circles who view it prudent to wind up India"s development activities. There has been a scathing criticism of India"s aid diplomacy and "soft power" approach whenever India"s mission or personnel are targeted. In times of such attacks, the talks of sending in the army, or "putting boots on ground," gain credence particularly in the military circles. Thinkers like Gurmeet Kanwal are not averse to putting boots on ground to retaliate and prevent such systematic targeting. Gurmeet Kanwal has written, "I wouldn"t use the expression, "flex its muscles". I would say the time has come to live up to our responsibility. If it involves military intervention, so be it." 69 In addition to sending troops there are increased calls for training troops to retain India"s influence in the security sector. According to C. Raja Mohan:
"Instead of debating whether we should send troops to Afghanistan, Delhi should look at a range of other ways it can help Kabul and Washington make the Afghan National Army a credible and effective fighting force. The best contribution that India could make might be in the areas of combat training and creating capacities in logistics and communications. India could also perhaps help the Afghans in re-building their Air Force." 70 Of late, there are talks of training and rearming the Northern Alliance, who have been India"s allies during the Taliban interregnum in Afghanistan. In a scenario of return to the civil war situation, it is not unlikely that India might use its "northern card." 71 In addition, there has been increasing moves to revive the traditional and historical linkages among the Pushtuns as a counter-force and protectors to India"s development projects in the south and east.
Surge of Pakistani Influence in Kabul: Talking to the Taliban
Critics in India have been quick to point out that fixing of an arbitrary timeframe to the summer of 2011 drawdown of forces, runs the danger of working to the advantage of the insurgent propaganda. 72 New Delhi is concerned about the ramifications of that possible US troop drawdown, which New Delhi feels is accelerating the Afghan Government"s efforts to reconcile with the Taliban and America"s hurry to hand over responsibility of running the country to the Hamid Karzai administration. India worries that Washington is moving too fast and leaving the door open for Pakistan military"s manoeuvres in reinstalling a pliant regime.
The need to painstakingly stick to President Obama"s promise of a "conditions-based process" for leaving Afghanistan is compelling the US to take extraordinary steps to engage the Taliban. Former US Af-Pak envoy Ambassador, Richard Holbrooke, travelled to New York on 6 July 2010 specifically to negotiate the removal of select Taliban members from the UN anti-terror blacklist. Thinkers like Brajesh Mishra observe, "The worry is caused by a feeling in the policy establishment that the US wants to get out [of Afghanistan] as soon as possible…Pakistan wants to broker a deal. The worry is that would lead us back to the 1990s." Karzai, seemingly out of desperation, appears amenable to shake hands with Pakistan.
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While Nehruvians can still argue that the warmth between Afghanistan and Pakistan will not be at India"s cost, it remains a fact that in recent times Karzai has tried to sideline the 72 In the Indian context, the COIN campaigns are carried out over a large timeframe under the liberal democratic constitutional framework where the state is ready to "bleed" to let the insurgent groups engage the state through various dialogue mechanisms and in some cases even political representation. Northern Alliance, a group that not only remains opposed to any form of peace with the Taliban, has not gone unnoticed in the Realist camp. Karzai"s dismissal of Interior Minister Hanif Atmar, belonging to the People"s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), and National Security Chief Amrullah Saleh, belonging to the Northern Alliance, citing security lapses leading to an attack on the June 2010 peace Jirga 76 has been interpreted as an attempt to remove internal hurdles to the reconciliation plan.
The release of 90,000 classified US military documents related to the Afghan war by the whistleblower website WikiLeaks, 77 vindicated New Delhi"s charge that Pakistan"s intelligence agency, the ISI, has been playing a double-game in Afghanistan by providing both supplies and sanctuary to Taliban fighters. The documents, now in public domain, substantiated the charge that the ISI continued to maintain liaisons with and support for the Taliban despite claims by the Pakistani Government that ISI was swept clean of pro-Taliban officers years ago. The document revealed that General Hamid Gul, ISI"s Director-General from 1987 to 1989, still operates in Pakistan informally serving the agency. 78 However, it is highly unlikely that the revelations, known to the US policymakers all the while, would bring about dramatic changes in the dynamics of US-Pakistan counter-terrorism cooperation. While Pakistan remains a key ally for the US in the anti-Taliban operations in Afghanistan, the Pakistani military stands to benefit from the huge financial and military aid it accrues as a beneficiary of such cooperation. While US officials privately admit the deep complicity of the Pakistan army and the ISI on maintaining links with top levels of Afghan Taliban leadership, even as they jointly fight the war against terror, they are unwilling to publicly admit or delink from such self-defeating cooperation.
Reverting to the Traditional Alliance
The possibility of US and NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan and the accommodation of Taliban without strengthening the Afghan Government are could compel India to work towards a coalition with Iran and Russia. This "self-interested coalition" 79 in the longer run could also include several Central Asian states that fear a Taliban return to Kabul. While the Taliban remain an anathema for Iran, Russia and India who believe that the extremists would pose significant risks to the region if allowed to come back to power, it was Russia"s opposition that stalled US moves to remove Taliban from the UN blacklist. Moscow repeated its charges at the Kabul conference in 2010 that any such move to rehabilitate an unrepentant Taliban must be resisted.
After years of chill between India and Iran, since the days when India voted with the US against Iran"s nuclear programme, a new warming between both countries was perceptible. In the first week of August 2010, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Mohammad Ali Fathollahi visited India on a three-day tour to discuss wide-ranging issues including efforts to stabilise Afghanistan. This was the second ministerial visit from Iran to India in less than a month; it followed the 9 July 2010 Joint Commission meeting at which both countries had discussed expediting the expansion of Chabahar Port in Iran, a move that could deepen India"s reach in both Afghanistan and Central Asia, bypassing Pakistan. This came at a time when the rights of trade and transit through Pakistan"s territory are yet again denied to India at the recently concluded Afghanistan-Pakistan Trade and Transit Agreement (APTTA).
India and Iran have also decided to hold structured and regular consultations with regards to closer cooperation in Afghanistan. Both have been seen as inching closer in their assessments of the unravelling Afghan quagmire and both have been seen to perceive a strategic advantage in coordinating efforts against the Taliban. In the days leading to the ouster of the Taliban regime in 2001, both India and Iran backed the Northern Alliance. However, with Iran blocking the transit of fuel into Afghanistan, the difficult US-Iran relations and India and Iran have a deadlocked relationship, most recently hit by an oil payments problem, the workings of this coalition seem mired in problems. Moreover, with India signing an agreement for the 680 km Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline in Ashgabat in December 2010, the 2,300 km Iran-Pakistan-India gas (IPI) pipeline has been put on a backburner. The US backing for the TAPI project and attempts to wean India away from the IPI pipeline is seen as a move to further isolate Iran.
During the first week of August 2010, Ms Nirupama Rao, the Indian Foreign Secretary visited Russia, and held talks with her Russian counterpart, First Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Denisov, and Deputy Foreign Minister Alexei Borodavkin who reiterated Moscow's continued emphasis on the red lines for the reconciliation of the Taliban, drawn at the London Conference on Afghanistan. The security situation in Afghanistan and the need to develop a coordinated strategy between both countries was discussed during foreign office consultations in Moscow. Russia which allowed the US to transport weapons across its territory to Afghanistan in 2009, has been wary of the Taliban insurgency"s destabilising effect on Central Asian republics and the spilling over effect of instability into its Caucasus region. During Russian President Dmitry Medvedev"s visit to New Delhi last year, both sides agreed to further step up their cooperation for peace and stability in Afghanistan.
Future Scenarios and India's Policy Options
Following President Obama"s speech at West Point in December 2009, announcing troop surge with a tentative date for the drawdown of forces, coupled by talks of withdrawal among NATO countries, concerns abound among Afghans and regional countries of the international commitment in stabilising Afghanistan. Though there has been subsequent toning down of the "withdrawal" talks since then, there has seemed to be a rush to bring the Afghan gamble to an end. However, consensus among the NATO allies and the US on the timeline of withdrawal has remained elusive as much as defining an "end state", as witnessed during the NATO Lisbon Summit in November 2010. The lack of unified vision and effort among the international community has only contributed to dissipated efforts. Every actor is interested in imposing their own defined "end state" on Afghanistan, as seen through their national agendas, with little understanding or interest in enabling the Afghans.
As the international community is "muddling along", India will have to prepare for three scenarios in order to protect its core national security interests which might call for redefinition of its role in the evolving situation. More importantly, in the limited window of opportunity (2011-14), India will have to maximise its economic, socio-cultural and regional leverages for the long-term stabilisation of Afghanistan. Though there has been subsequent scaling down of talks by the Obama administration and the probability of withdrawal by the summer of 2011 seems less likely, what remains worrisome, however, is the hurry to bring the Afghan conflict to an end. As the Afghan quagmire deepens and US domestic support for the war in Afghanistan wanes, it is possible that the western coalition in its haste to find "quick-fix" solutions will not be averse to continuing support for warlords and militias, and accommodating the Taliban, without efforts of instituting checks and balances to check the probability of subversion. In absence of a national reconciliation strategy and without attempts to build a politically inclusive order that calls for political sector reform, the strategy of passing on authority to a weak and discredited civilian government in Kabul seems in danger of failure. If the international forces were to begin withdrawal without ensuring a stable and credible government in Kabul, it is not unlikely that the Taliban would fill in the ensuing political vacuum.
Options for India
This scenario could compel India to downsize its operations in Afghanistan. To negate the possibility of this scenario, India might have to rely on its "northern" card. This time around, India might have to revive its traditional and historical linkages with the Pushtuns as well. This strategy would be adopted by other regional powers that would arm and support their proxies. The Northern Alliance, compared to yester years, is much weaker today and would welcome any assistance in terms of arms and training. Such networks can be revived and can act as protectors of Indian aid projects but mostly in the north and west to which India"s presence might be restricted.
Alternatively, India could support the current Afghan-led reintegration process. It can be more accommodating towards the idea of having those factions of the insurgency (those whom have indicated willingness to engage with India) included in Afghanistan"s political process and power-sharing arrangement. This, however, would require a stable Afghan Government with constitutional guarantees and adherence to the "red lines" set out at the London Conference in 2010.
Scenario II: US Limited Engagement-Intensification of the "Proxy War"
The most probable scenario beyond the summer of 2011 is the reduced US presence in Afghanistan with troops limited to protecting key cities, a shift from overstretched counterinsurgency to a foreign internal defence (FID) 81 model and a greater reliance on special force
operations. This could mean that the countryside would be open to the Taliban"s influence -a mixed optimal case scenario for the Afghans and continuation of the present stalemate.
This would allow Pakistan military and intelligence agencies to continue its hedging strategy, whereby it continues supporting the Afghan Taliban and its proxy groups with the eventual goal of reinstating a pliant regime. In this scenario, the geopolitical competition would ensure the continuation of the present quagmire. In the case of intense regional competition and support for proxies continues, the balkanisation of Afghanistan into spheres of influence would not be a distant possibility.
In this scenario, India would be able to continue its aid policy with an objective of preventing Afghanistan"s backwards slide into chaos, anarchy and destruction. Capacity building, community participation and local ownership would remain critical tools in sustaining the effectiveness of Indian aid. However, the current level and pattern of assistance programmes would have to be expanded and diversified to increase Afghan ownership by providing incentives. Low visibility projects with greater Afghan participation, both at the government and community levels would be the most feasible option. In the south and east, SDPs could be carried out by reviving support among traditional Pushtun groups and the second generation of Pushtun leaders, given that there is huge appreciation and demand for Indian projects in these areas.
However, much of the large scale aid and reconstruction activity would have to be limited to the north and west, given the insecurity that would continue to prevail in the south and east of the country. To ensure the safety and security of its interests and personnel, it might have to maintain its own security force, much larger than the current state of its paramilitary deployment. However, it cannot be a full-fledged military engagement. Such a measure will be counter-productive and will affect India"s image in Afghanistan in the long term. India could alternately play a lead role in training the Afghan national security forces and in developing counter-insurgency capabilities as well as providing defence equipment.
On a diplomatic front, India needs to work towards the creation of a "concert of powers" -a regional grouping which includes the US, Russia, the European Union (EU), India, Iran, the Central Asian republics and China. 82 India could play a lead role in carving out a greater role for the UN and the deployment of UN forces in Afghanistan symbolising the UN Security Council"s endorsement 83 would not entirely be a misplaced policy option.
Scenario III: US Long-Term Commitment-Building on Afghan State Capacities
This would be a best case scenario for the Afghans, though such a state of affair seems unlikely given the downturn in the US economy and waning public support for the overstretched Afghan war in the US and its NATO allies. This would call for additional resources including troops to train and partner with the Afghan forces and the continuation of institution-building programmes for the next 10-15 years.
Options for India
India could play a lead role in institution and capacity building of the political, security, economic and justice sectors. However, given that such a scenario would not last indefinitely, in the near and medium term, India would need to pursue a reinvigorated policy in terms of protecting its projects and carving out a larger regional role in the stabilisation of Afghanistan. This has to be based on dynamic rethinking of its political, diplomatic and military options for the long term. Most certainly, India will have to make tough policy choices before the summer of 2011.
The Way Forward
As the international community seems to be in a rush to bring its ominous gamble in Afghanistan to an end, India has a limited window of opportunity to enable Afghans to play a lead role in their nation-building efforts. If the stated goal of transfer of authority, as set out by the Afghan President, were to be actualised by 2014, there are opportunities for India to deepen its levels of engagement at various levels in the near to medium term. 84 1. Security: India can expand its role in training of the Afghan national security force (army and police) and air force. India could play an enabling role in training of the officer corps.
As the process of reintegration gains momentum, India"s experience of building a counter-insurgency grid in Jammu and Kashmir, and reintegration of the surrendered militants while providing employment opportunities could have some important lessons for Afghanistan. It could also help evolve civil-military relations. 2. Political Reform: India needs to work with the Afghan Government towards long-term political sector reform. The need for a parliamentary system with political parties system to build inclusive political orders is being increasingly felt both by the people and the politicians of other ethnic affiliations. The past presidential and parliamentary elections in Afghanistan have indicated the need for electoral and political reforms. The political impasse following the delay of the inauguration of the Afghan Parliament does not bode well for the long-term stability of the country. India could help in developing a federal polity based on its own experience of carving out and balancing the centre-state relations that represents and accommodates diverse and pluralistic ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic identities. 3. Reviving Traditional Networks: India"s policy of over-identifying with the "Karzai" government in the past few years has alienated its traditional allies, the Northern Alliance groups. There is a need to revive the historical linkages with old networks not only in the north and west but also among the Pushtun networks in south and east. There are alienated Pushtun communities in south and east Afghanistan are in need of Indian support in building local capacities in agriculture, rural development and alternate livelihoods. 4. Reconciliation and Reintegration: As some local commanders and insurgent faction leaders are sending feelers for reconciliation, India needs to widen its web of engagement. This is a requisite of counter-insurgency of separating the local commanders from the ideologically-hardened insurgent leadership based in Pakistan. However, the adherence to the "red lines" stated at the London Conference including respect for the Afghan constitution, human and women rights would be crucial to prevent subversion of progress made thus far. Afghanistan"s attempts at reconciliation need to be supported by larger political and constitutional reforms which would necessitate provisions for dialogue, autonomy and special representation of minorities, women and marginalised groups. 5. Governance: India could play a critical role in developing the decentralised structures of governance, based on its own Panchayati Raj system. Promoting grassroots democracy and local self-government institutions can emerge as an alternative to the top down approach adopted by the international community. India has worked at strengthening local institutions through the small development projects. These efforts need to be continued and intensified. One of the success stories of Afghanistan is the National Solidarity Program (NSP) that needs greater funding and support. While India has worked towards shoring up the Afghan Government"s capacity in aid delivery, improving aid effectiveness would remain a critical goal. Towards this end, the participation of the local civilians in identifying and prioritising aid projects would remain crucial. 6. Economic: There is an immediate need for development of alternate livelihood programmes as well as reviving Afghanistan"s traditional artisan and agricultural base. India"s rich experience with Green Revolution could be usefully replicated in relatively stable northern parts of Afghanistan. Saffron cultivation in poppy-growing areas would be useful means of alternate livelihood project as part of an effective counter-narcotics strategy. Natural resource exploitation and industrial development in the relatively stable north and west provide opportunities of employment for the youth. Moreover, it would help Afghanistan graduate from being an externally dependent "rentier state" to a selfsustaining economy. Indian business houses could be encouraged to invest in the mineral and energy sector in the relatively stable north and west. 7. Employment Generation and Industrial Base: There is also an urgent need for establishing an indigenous economic base to spur economic independence and generate employment, which would actively engage the youth of the country. Afghanistan, due to its very low tax regime, is swamped by foreign goods mainly from Pakistan, China and Iran. This inhibits the growth of local indigenous industrial base. India could contribute to establishing small-scale industries such as a carpet industry along with ornaments and handicrafts industry to help artisans, weavers and craftsmen. Follow-up studies on these projects, assessing their usefulness and linking with the development strategy of the Afghan Government, would be extremely critical. India"s role being well received by the Afghans provides it with opportunity to invest actively in agriculture, rural development and small-scale industries and mining which would provide employment generating opportunities. 8. Social and Cultural Capital: India needs to further capitalise on its traditional, historical, social and cultural capital in Afghanistan. As part of the counter-radicalisation campaign, messages of moderate Islam from the Deoband would be a good counter to neutralise the radical Wahabi messages. There is also a need to further expand the cultural, sports and educational exchanges between the two countries. Cricket is an important and popular sport that needs promotion within Afghanistan. The success of conducting Indo-Afghan musical concert in Jalalabad needs to be replicated in other regions as well. Music, art and poetry could be a binding chord for the peoples of the region. Setting up Pushtun centres in India and cultural centres in Afghanistan would be an important step. 9. Education: While there has been an appreciation of the educational scholarship programme, there is a need to ensure that deserving and meritorious students are selected. Setting up a board with Afghan and Indian observers for the process could be a step in ensuring that quality and transparency is maintained. Emphasis needs to be on vocational and "hands on" technical training programmes that would help the Afghan youth find employment in their country. 10. Strategic Communications: Most of the international media puts out pessimistic stories from Afghanistan. It influences not only domestic public opinion but also works into the Taliban propaganda. It is crucial to build on the strategic communications to publicise positive stories through the radio, television and local print media, newsletters and leaflets. In places like Jalalabad, there have been requests for broadcast of programmes on history, culture, education and sports from India. There have also been requests for training of journalists and technicians to build the local media in Afghanistan. 11. Public Diplomacy: New Delhi needs to play an active role in public diplomacy campaign to highlight the rationale behind its developmental role. There is a need of active interface and exchange of ideas between the academia, non-governmental organisations, media, the youth, civil society and women groups as part of Track II initiatives. 12. Regional Cooperation: There is a demand for seamless information sharing, joint patrolling, border regimes and confidence building measures amongst the regional powers in addressing the challenge of terror in the region. On the economic front, India needs to work through SAARC to ensure better economic integration of Afghanistan with the region, which would accrue huge economic benefits and help build the "peace constituencies" in the region. 13. Engaging Pakistan: India will need to explore the option of engaging with Pakistan"s military directly in addressing the issue of sanctuary in that country and at the same time prevent its slide to instability. New Delhi will need to work on confidence building mechanisms and opening channels of communication not only with the civilian leadership but also with the Pakistan military, given the leverage the military has in dealing with the insurgency.
These goals, however, will have to be achieved within the limited window of opportunity of two to three years . If New Delhi is unable to help the process of 'Afghan-isation' to enable Afghans take a lead role, and the western coalition quits without addressing the longterm stabilisation concerns in the region (Scenario I), the prospect of Indian downsizing its presence Afghanistan will not be entirely farfetched.
In the event of US limited engagement in Afghanistan beyond 2011 (Scenario II), India could continue with its assistance programme in Afghanistan. It would prevent Afghanistan"s slide backwards into chaos, anarchy and destruction. The need would be to increase Afghan participation by raising the stakes and providing incentives. Low visibility projects with greater Afghan participation, both at the government and community level, would help in capacity building and ownership of the projects.
The complexity of the rapidly shifting dynamics in Afghanistan poses the greatest challenge for policymaking. The task of India, being outside the military operations, is even more difficult. It has to resist the temptations of military involvement and, at the same time, will have to protect its interest and personnel from systematic targeting. The expansion of Afghanistan"s economic footprint is in India"s long-term strategic interests. Thus, a lonesome policy of generating goodwill through aid diplomacy needs rethinking and possible expansion within the next two to three years. As developments in Afghanistan will directly impinge on India"s security, and the search for the "end game" quickens, New Delhi will have to position itself as a serious stakeholder in the long-term stabilisation of Afghanistan.
. . . . .
